By Olukayode Idowu
Military government of Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso recently announced the withdrawal of their countries from ECOWAS indicating the final fallout of the crisis brought about by military overthrowing of democratic governance and a spiral of reactions to revert to democracy, Michael Olugbode writes that caution is needed to walk this road.
West Africa used to be an amalgam of many proud empires and kingdoms that spanned centuries, some of which included Ghana, Mali Songhai, Wolof, Oyo, Benin and Kanem Bornu before the advent of colonialism. There were and still is well over a thousand existing local languages including cross-border native tongues such as Ewe, Fulfulde, Hausa, Mandingo, Wolof, Yoruba, Ga, among others spoken by over 400 million people who occupy about 5.1 million square kilometres. The colonists gave them a legacy of three official languages English, French and Portuguese, and perhaps their relationship are stronger along the language dichotomy that may sometimes depict a further subjugation to a bigger power who though might have given the independence by somehow pool the strings!
It is often seen that the region’s cultural, linguistic and ecological diversity presents both opportunities and challenges for the integration process. But there has always be the longing interest by the countries in the region to combine forces politically and economically in order to engender co-prosperity in the area.
The first effort at integration dates back to 1945 with the creation of CFA franc that brought the francophone countries of the region into a single currency union. Then in 1964, Liberian president William Tubman proposed an economic union for West Africa leading to an agreement which was signed in 1965 by the four states of Cote d’Ivore, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
However, it was not until 1972 that a proposal for a union of West African States emerged. That year, the Nigerian head of state led by Gen Yakubu Gowon (Nigeria) and his Togolese counterpart Gnassingbe Eyadema toured the region in support of the integration Idea. Thanks to the drafts that emanated from their efforts. These formed the basis for the emergence of the treaty of Lagos in 1975 which birthed ECOWAS. The treaty of Lagos was originally touted as an economic initiative, but emerging political events led to its revision and therewith the expansion of scope and powers in 1993.
ECOWAS is meant to foster interstate economic and political cooperation.
It has been growing in leaps and bounds,
In 1976, Cape Verde, one of the two Lusophone countries in the region joined ECOWAS, and in December 2000, Mauritania withdrew its membership.
ECOWAS was established, “To promote cooperation and integration … to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability.”
Although created for economic reasons, the bloc has since gained political relevance, playing a key role in resolving political disputes in member countries.
ECOWAS at various time have had to play some of these roles: an arbiter in regional conflicts through ECOMOG (economic monitoring group) thus restoring peace in Liberia, intervened in Sierra Leone and restored order in 1997, it also intervened in the civil war of Guinea Bissau hence a credit to ECOWAS; offered assistance to crumbling West African economies especially after the departure of colonialism when the colonial masters withdrew their support; Member states committed themselves not to attack one another through the non- aggression treaty signed in 1976. This promoted peace in West Africa; put up a strong standing army (ECOMOG) of 15 battalions to sort out West African problems in case of a crisis, this has limited aggression and counter aggression; has a clause of non interference in the internal affairs of member states, this in effect promoted a period of peace and development in West Africa.
Also it has successfully undertaken large projects among member states to their completion which would have hitherto called for external assistance and borrowing for example the West African power pool was started to construct power stations in different countries of West Africa. This boosted industrial development for example Diama and Manatali dams in Senegal and Mali respectively; ensured free mobility of people, goods and services, this was enforced in the 4th Heads of State Summit in Dakar Senegal where passports and visa restrictions were removed. This in effect reduced unemployment and promoted the spirit of togetherness; trade has been enhanced through the removal of customs duties and tariffs on commodities originating from West Africa. This promoted industrialization in West Africa. This was approved in 2002; trees were planted to reclaim the Sahel region on recommendation and approval of ECOWAS. This in effect has conserved the environment and steps to improve the environment upheld since 1982; much emphasis was put on agro-based processing industries and much support given to agriculture. This has increased the exports hence leading to favorable GDP of West African states. Crops like pawpaw, cotton, cocoa, rubber have been given priority.
ECOWAS has equally effectively encouraged exploitation of West African minerals like oil in Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Gambia among others. Other minerals include, Gold, copper, diamond, which all improved the economies of West Africa; has effectively represented West Africa on the international forum, and acquisition of international markets like AGOA (African growth and opportunity act), it also deals with the European Union and this has enhance West African bargaining power on prices in the world market; it has asked West African states to exercise rule of law, free trade, protection of workers rights and this improved the standards of living of the Africans in West Africa; it has enhanced the spirit of Pan Africanism and non alignment and this in effect repulsed neo-colonialism.
On the side of infrastructures, ECOWAS is credited for putting up modern transport and communication networks in the member states and putting emphasis on LDCs, it has protected, promoted and preserved African cultures by encouraging preservation of antiquities hence upholding the dignity of Africans.
It has however not being Uhuru with the bloc has it has had to face numerous challenges including political instability in member states, countries like Nigeria and Ghana have witnessed military coups, civil wars have been fought in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d’voire, these have been a hindrance to cooperation; nationalistic issues with most member states giving priority to their own domestic issues at the expense of the organisation; language barrier, countries in West Africa inherited the languages of their former colonial masters leaving the problem in communication to hinder the efficient operation of the organisation; infrastructural problems, the state of roads, railway, and communication linkages are poor, this has hampered the economic progress of member states.
Also challenges have been faced in Ideological differences, the leaders of the member states view each other with suspicion and mistrust due to differences in ideologies; lack of uniform currency, each country has its own currency and this has created a problem of rates of exchange thus hindering trade; foreign interference; the presence of Israeli and French soldiers in Cote D’voire was viewed suspiciously by Guinea, and the challenge of sometimes border closures, for example between Ghana and Togo and between Burkina Faso and Mali.
At the heart of the present crisis is the growing military intervention in governance, the juntas have always given an excuse of foreign interference in the internal affairs of their countries and growing terrorism as the reason for interregnum, on the other hand ECOWAS has kept to its gun that military rule is a No and that it need to be punished and discouraged. It reached boiling point with the sanction of Niger and the early sanctions of Mali and Burkina Faso. With the adamant military rulers of the three countries seeming to unite to slug it out with their fellow West African brothers not fully thinking of the dangers that lie ahead.
The trio recently announced their exiting from ECOWAS, alleging illegal, illegitimate and inhumane sanctions. They added that ECOWAS has moved away from the ideals of its founding fathers and Pan-Africanism.
The three countries said in a joint statement recently that: “ECOWAS, under the influence of foreign powers, betraying its founding principles, has become a threat to its member states and its populations whose happiness it is supposed to ensure,”
The exit of these countries is perhaps a blow to ECOWAS’ efforts to strengthen democracy in the region at a time when there appears to be new found love for coups. The economic bloc seems not to recognize the decisions of the three countries, leaving us with the question whether these countries can leave ECOWAS without the latter’s consent. Chances are that they can even though the ECOWAS charter stipulates otherwise.
The decision to act contrary to what the charter stipulates is a sign that they will get away with ‘murder’ the same way they seem to be getting away with the coups in their countries.
What does the ECOWAS Charter say?
The ECOWAS charter stipulates that “any Member State wishing to withdraw from the Community shall give to the Executive Secretary one year’s notice in writing who shall inform the Member States thereof. At the expiration of this period, if such notice is not withdrawn, such a State shall cease to be a member of the Community.”
The three countries did not notify ECOWAS, at least according to the sub-regional body, perhaps in a show of defiance.
It would be recalled that due to the threat of terrorism confronting the West African region, the region in 2019 developed the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on the Fight Against Terrorism to combat terrorism and enhance security in the West African region. The plan has priority areas for regional action, with a budget of 2.1 billion Dollars for a five years period (2020 – 2024). ECOWAS is expected to mobilise 1 billion USD of its own resources for the plan and Nigeria pledged to contribute the sum of Three Hundred and Fifty Million Dollars ($350,000,000) for the five years of implementation of the master plan. So far UEMOA has contributed 100 million USD out its pledge of 500 million USD, Nigeria has also contributed 100 million USD and Ghana has contributed 20 million USD.
Contribution to the frontline countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
Under the plan, the sum of 100 million USD was released in 2020 directly to these frontline countries for the fight against terrorism;
ECOWAS has also approved the sum of 1.8 million USD to these countries for the purchase of equipment for the fight against terrorism;
ECOWAS with its support of its partners have also provided various support to these countries in the fight against terrorism, including training and intelligence
Humanitarian Support to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
In line with the mandate of the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy, immediate relief measures were implemented to alleviate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated the challenges of conflict, terrorism, climate change and the risk of invasion of crop pests such as desert locusts and armyworm in the Sahel region. Thus, the solidarity to Member states (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Northern Nigeria) in the form of food donation (millet, corn, sorghum and rice) was sourced from the stocks of the Regional Food Security Reserve and funded from the ECOWAS Humanitarian Relief Fund to the tune of USD 1million. Also, USD 2.2million from the contingency budget of the EU-funded West Africa Food Security Storage Support Project, was committed to increase the food assistance to the targeted countries by mobilising stock from the Regional Reserve. The food items were distributed free of charge to vulnerable households most affected by the crises.
Implementation of Regional Post-Flood Intervention to Member States affected by floods in 2020 coupled with the negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Regional Flood Response Fund Disbursement in 2021
1. Burkina Faso $301,000
2.. Guinea $217,000
3. Mali $348,000
4. Niger $497,000
3. 2022 FOOD DONATION BY ECOWAS:
On the 17th of June 2022 – As part of its mission of humanitarian assistance to Member States, ECOWAS proceeded this Friday to the delivery of food to the authorities of Burkina Faso. – 6402 tons of food -rice, maize, sorghum, millet. The presentation was officially made by H.E Jean Claude kassi BROU, President of the ECOWAS Commission, in the presence of General Francis BÉHANZIN, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and H.E Tiena COULIBALY, ECOWAS Resident Representative in Burkina Faso.
Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food
On the 24 June – ECOWAS has made available to the Republic of Niger 4,023 tons of food grains this morning in Niamey to support the government’s efforts to control the difficult food situation of the most vulnerable populations.
This provision of food comes after that of 2021 with 7598 tons of cereals and 205 tons of enriched flour and that of 2018 with 6528 tons of cereals in the form of a loan and that of 2020 with 473 tons of cereals in the form of a donation from the from ECOWAS and its partners in response to COVID-19.
In 2023 Funds were approved by the President of the Commission for the Flood response
Burkina Faso (2,826,990 USD) – this includes the USD 2,525,600 for IDPs,
Mali ( 886,898 USD) and
Niger (545,472 USD)
However, they have not submitted the required documentation to ECOWAS to process and to access these funds in 2023.
The economic sanction imposed on Niger following the July 2023 coup, led to a loss of about $50 million in potential earnings and revenues in just three weeks following the border closure.
Nigerien families bore the brunt of the sanctions alongside their Nigerian neighbours who live in border communities.
In addition to economic and political implications, there are security implications. As the withdrawing states continue to move towards alternative sources to secure their states, which is a key promise made by the junta on taking over, their already porous borders become even more porous allowing unsuspecting criminal groups to infiltrate and begin to operate within their borders.
This is not only detrimental for them but also for their neighbours with whom they no longer share intelligence. For a region that is already bedevilled by several terrorist factions, the situation will only worsen. For example, Niger until last year’s coup was a member of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) set up by neighbouring countries (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin) to jointly share intelligence and fight terrorists who operate across the countries.
A comprehensive assessment of the implications of the withdrawal of the three countries is done as an aid and potential guide to the formulation of policy options by the ECOWAS in its engagements with the three countries on the matter, and these are:
Political and Security Implications
The exit of the three countries from ECOWAS after almost five decades of constant diplomatic, political and security cooperation will erode the acquis realized. Firstly, the withdrawal may lead to diplomatic and political isolation for the three countries. Thanks to the solidarity of ECOWAS, these countries have been able to make significant gains in the international scene, obtaining bloc support for their candidates and candidature in the contest for international positions, be it within the African Union, the United Nations, and other similar platforms. By withdrawing the influence of the countries, and by extension ECOWAS, will decrease on the continental and global stage.
Secondly, the security of both the withdrawing states and ECOWAS will worsen. In the fight against terrorism, violent extremism, and organized crime, the ECOWAS Member States have been working on both bilateral and regional fronts to counter the diverse threats. At the regional level, ECOWAS is implementing an Action Plan against Terrorism, with most of the funds to be mobilized from voluntary contributions of Member States. Already, USD 100 million mobilized by UEMOA member states to the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Fund was disbursed to the three countries – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Moreover, some allocations (USD7.5 m) from the Fund have been made towards supporting the countries to acquire materials to help their fight against terrorism. With the withdrawal, there is a risk that the security cooperation in terms of sharing intelligence, participation in regional counter-terrorism actions, such as the Accra Initiative and Multinational Joint Task Force may decrease or collapse. This is more so as suspicion has arisen between the three Member States and ECOWAS on the perceived interference of foreign powers in the affairs of the Community. The establishment of the Alliance of the Sahelian States in September 2023, formalized through the Liptako-Gourma Charter, represents a significant move towards isolation of the trio from the ECOWAS led efforts for fighting terrorism and insecurity in the region.
On the social relationship among the people, particularly at the cross-border communities, if the separation becomes hostile, it will lead to cross-border tensions between the three states and their ECOWAS counterparts. Cross-border crimes will increase as cross-border security cooperation reduce.
Thirdly, the security landscape of ECOWAS will be increasingly dominated by geo-politics. The anti-French sentiment whipped by the Military Authorities in the three countries to justify their coup d’etat, and the rapprochement with Russia as alternative source of military and economic relations, manifesting in their official visits to Moscow and the presence of Russian backed foreign military and security company in the region, present a major geo-political issue that is complicating the security of ECOWAS. History has shown that in this type of situation, geo-political calculations, rather than the genuine security concern of the ECOWAS Member States, will be the end game, eventually leaving the region shattered. As the experience of Ukraine has shown, geo-political conflicts can be protracted and highly destructive to the proxy-war environment.
The withdrawal of the three Member States is buoyed by the promise of the Atlantic Initiative led by Morocco, which seeks to provide the landlocked countries with access to the sea. This initiative may draw West Africa into the protracted Algerian-Morocco rivalry, as the authorities in Mali terminated their participation in the 2015 Algiers Accord with the northern independence movement groups on January 25, 2024. It remains to be seen how the three countries can benefit from the Atlantic Initiative given that none of them share borders with Morocco.
Socio-Economic Implications:
There are wide-ranging socio-economic implications of the withdrawal relating to:
a. the benefits of free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment,
b. intra-community trade,
c. the implementation of the ECOWAS common external tariffs (CET),
d. food and nutrition security,
e. the Implementation of the Single Currency programme and
f. the implementation of ECOWAS programmes/projects/initiatives in the three member states.
The effects on the benefits of free movement of persons, rights of residence and establishment: The “immediate” or eventual withdrawal will automatically affect the immigration status of the citizens of the three member states in the region. It means that their citizens will require visa to travel to any of the 12 Member States, and vice versa. Their nationals will no longer be able to reside or set up businesses under ECOWAS arrangements but will be subject to compliance with diverse national laws of the ECOWAS Member States. Those already residing or established within the ECOWAS space, which are estimated to be in millions, will be recategorized as aliens, requiring compliance with diverse national immigration provisions, such as the application for residence permits, payment of resident permit fees, etc. The ECOWAS passport will no longer carry the privileges it has for the holder in the three countries. The three countries will revert to the use of their respective national passports. The ECOWAS Biometric National Identity Card which grants ECOWAS citizens the right to travel within the region will no longer apply in these three member states. These changes in travel documentation will have huge financial implications for the affected member states. Moreover, Citizens of these three countries will no longer benefit from the common “ECOWAS Brown Card” car insurance scheme, which provides motorists complete guarantee for a prompt, fair and immediate compensation for any accident that may occur outside their habitual residence country and exempts them from any other formality relating to the guarantee against the risks of civil liability. The situation of millions of refugees, who are victims of security crises in the region particularly from the three Member States, will be a subject of discussion.
The demographic data of the region shows that the three member states represent an important portion of the region’s population, which is estimated at 425.2 million by the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) as of 2023. Only three countries surpassed them with population size, namely Nigeria (223.8m), Ghana (34.1m) and Cote d’Ivoire (28.9). Niger is the fourth in population in ECOWAS with 27.2 million, followed by Burkina Faso and Mali, both having 23.3 million respectively. The three countries therefore constitute 17.4% of the region’s population. This will generate a major immigration challenge to the region. It will also be a big loss to the market size of ECOWAS.
The effect on intra-community trade: The exit of the three member states from ECOWAS will cause disruption to intra-community trade, and more broadly international trade. Presently, under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), different categories of products of community origin enjoy special status in the community market. Unprocessed goods – These are livestock, fish, plant, or mineral products that have not undergone any industrial transformation are exempted from duties and taxes of equivalent effect. Similarly, Traditional Handicraft Products – that is, articles made by hand with or without the help of tools, instruments or devices that are activated directly by the Craftsman, such as wooden cooking utensils, fancy goods, small cabinet work, mats, carpets, bed linen, footwear, headgear, prepared feathers, etc, are also exempt from duties, and taxes of equivalent effect. However, Industrial Products of Community Origin, classified into three groups enjoys different concessions, as follows:
– Total exemption from import duties and taxes
– No quantitative restriction
– Non-payment of compensation for loss of revenue for items (i) and (ii) as a result of their importation.
Data on the pattern of trade involving the three Member States in the region will be affected by the withdrawal. Globally, in 2022, the region’s trade amounted to USD 277.221 billion of which USD 131.365 billion was for exports and USD 145.456 billion for imports. Intra-regional trade was USD 25.619 billion of which USD 13.275 billion was exports and USD 12.344 billion was imports. Thus, the share of intra-regional trade was 9.2% in 2022. The main products traded in the region for both exports and imports are mineral products, food products, transport equipment, chemicals and related products, plastics and rubber, and products of the plant and animal kingdoms.
Member States have a differentiated contribution to ECOWAS’ external trade as an autonomous entity trading with other countries in the world (Third Countries). The average contribution of States to intra-Community trade shows that Côte d’Ivoire (21.9%), Nigeria (19.2%), Mali (12.1%), Senegal (10.2%), Ghana (8.6%) and Burkina Faso (6.7%) have the most exchanges with their partners in the region. Niger (4.2%), Guinea (4.1%) and Togo (4.0%) have an average contribution of just over 4% while the other countries recorded a share of less than 4%.
The three Member States (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) account for a smaller share of inter-regional exports, falling from 12.5% of the total in 2018 to 7.9% in 2022. The sum of the exports of the 3 countries declined from US$1.22 billion in 2018 to US$1.05 billion in 2022. In 2022, the three countries ranked 6th (Burkina Faso), 8th (Mali) and 9th (Niger) as the largest exporters of regional trade.
The three countries account for a higher share of intra-regional imports, increasing from 37.8% of the total in 2018 to 41.8% in 2022. The sum of the three countries’ imports increased from US$3.2 billion in 2018 to $5.2 billion in 2022. These three countries play an important regional role in stimulating demand in the region. As such, they are key importers in the region, ranking 1st (Burkina Faso), 3rd (Mali) and 7th (Niger) in the region.
According to these data, Burkina Faso is a major importer of mineral fuels, cement, tobacco, and fertilizers from ECOWAS. It imports mainly from Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. Mali is a major importer of mineral fuels, importing US$2.5 billion in 2022, followed by cement and precious stones and metals. Mali imports mainly from Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. Niger is a major importer of mineral fuels from ECOWAS ($138.6 million), followed by cement and tobacco. It imports mainly from Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana.
The effect on the implementation of the ECOWAS common external tariffs (CET): The withdrawal of the three Member States will lead to a dysfunction of the ECOWAS CET with repercussions on the prices of imported products. For instance, the Harmonized Customs Procedures (ECOWAS Customs Code), used for the Interconnected Goods in Transit Management System (SIGMAT) is likely to experience disruptions that could lead to its shutdown, which will constitute a risk leading to fraud and cross-border insecurity. As a result, customs procedures will be made more cumbersome.
However, as the three Members States belong to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which implements similar trade and customs policies, their companies may continue to benefit from the WAEMU free trade area and Customs Union but will miss out on the larger ECOWAS market.
On the effects on food and nutrition security: The withdrawal of the three Member States will disrupt the agrosylvopastoral and fisheries production systems and will have a major consequence, leading to the accentuation of food and nutrition insecurity of the entire region. There is high likelihood of increases in the prices of livestock, poultry, and other animal products in coastal countries; a decline in the economic activities of small and medium-sized agri-food enterprises in coastal and Sahelian countries; rise of prices of basic foodstuffs across the region. As earlier shown on the pattern of trade in the region, there is a high amount of interdependence among the ECOWAS member states for basic commodities, which supports the food security system in the region. The three Sahel countries (Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso) are mainly suppliers of (i) live animals (large livestock and small ruminants) with an estimated value of $800 million per year, mainly to Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Ghana; (ii) market garden products including onions (500,000 tonnes per year), tomatoes (150,000 tonnes per year) are supplied to Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. In return, coastal countries trade to the three Sahel countries are mainly (i) cereals (maize, millet, sorghum) from Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire to Niger mainly; as well as (ii) fruits and vegetables (banana, plantain, pineapple, avocado); (iii) tubers and tuber derivatives (gari flour, placali and attiéké) and products from the agri-food industry (vegetable juices, oils).
On the effect on the Implementation of the Single Currency programme: The withdrawal will affect the economic size of the single currency zone, ECO Zone, and its circulation. The ECO will guarantee the financial autonomy of the region by replacing the FCFA and other national currencies to ease economic transactions. In terms of economic momentum, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger posted strong economic growth, with average growth rates of 4.0%, 3.1% and 5.4% respectively over the last five years (2019-2023), higher than the ECOWAS average of 3.2% during the same period. Therefore, from a macroeconomic point of view, the three countries are among the most stable countries in the Community. Their withdrawal will lead to the cessation of ECOWAS/UEMOA multilateral surveillance missions that were carried out every six months to the Member States to check their performance towards establishing the single currency.
On the implementation of ECOWAS programmes/projects/initiatives in the three Member States: It is important to state that all the three countries are 100% beneficiaries of all ongoing ECOWAS Projects/Programmes (Community Programmes or Donor funds) – except for specific/targeted projects. Given their geographical position (Sahel), they benefit from some exclusive programmes/projects. For example:
a. The Regional Food Security Reserve (the three countries host stocks from the Regional Reserve for a quantity of nearly 17,000 tons or nearly 52% of the regional stock).
b. The Regional Support Program for Pastoralism in the Sahel (PRAPS – Financed by the World Bank) in the amount of USD 215 million for the three States.
c. The Sahel Regional Irrigation Support Program (PARIS – Financed by the World Bank) in the amount of USD 103.43 million for the three States.
d. The Regional Food System Resilience Support Program (FSRP funded by the World Bank) in the amount of USD 230 million for the three states.
e. Burkina Faso and Niger are participating countries in the West Africa Single Identity and Regional Integration and Inclusion (WURI) project. The project will be affected.
f. The ECOWAS Regional Electricity Market (West Africa Power Pool) project linking all member states to a regional electricity grid for improved access to electricity involves the three member states. This project may also be affected by their withdrawal as most of the technical and financial partners and ECOWAS may cease their engagements with them after the withdrawal.
The withdrawal of the three Member States could result in the halt or suspension of all ECOWAS Projects/Programmes worth more than US$500 million. It could also affect many other international projects, which are tied to ECOWAS or are conditional on respect for the principles of democracy including human rights and freedom. Already this is happening to these projects. In the end, the economic growth prospects of the countries will be significantly affected.
Overall, the economic fortunes of the three countries will be hugely affected by their exit from the Community. Already, the national economic profiles of these countries are telling enough. They are all classified as part of the 20 poorest countries in Africa, according to GDP per Capita, as reported by the IMF, such exit would have some dire consequences, particularly on the ordinary citizens. The three countries equally have the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) among the 15-member regional economic bloc, occupying 46, 48, and 51 positions respectively out of the 53 African countries captured in the 2022 United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report.
On the socio-economic front therefore, one would envisage significant dire economic consequences of their withdrawal from the community, with direct impacts on the citizenry. Trade barriers will be erected between the three countries and other members of ECOWAS bloc. It will disrupt vital supply chains, limit their access to coastal ports for purposes of external trade, and further jeopardize the livelihoods of their citizens, given that all these countries are landlocked.
Similarly, their withdrawal has the potential to impact negatively on the remaining member states of ECOWAS, particularly their supply of animal products such as meat, proteins (beans), and vegetables such as onions, tomatoes and other agricultural products that are supplied by these countries in abundance. This may have a direct impact on the general food supply chains and a possible food inflation and unemployment in the region. The withdrawal could therefore disrupt trade flows and regional supply chains, leading to higher prices for goods and services and economic hardship for citizens across the region. The socio-economic implications on the ordinary citizens could be dire.
According to a senior lecturer with the department of political science and international relations and director of strategic partnership at the Al-Muhibbah University, Abuja, Prof. Mukhtar Imam, the decision of the juntas is no victory for all. He said: “The reality is that these countries that have exited ECOWAS will have some losses no doubt, but this is a move calculated to hurt a regional body that is supposed to be an outfit for the realisation of the ideals of the founding fathers, which is basically to deepen cooperation among countries within the region and to be able to ensure that’s there’s a common front meaning speaking with a common voice. What they are trying to do is to prove to the world that there are dissent voices that we were not all on the same page and that they have grievances so to speak and as far as that particular objective is concerned, they have made a statement from their action in the forty five years of the existence of ECOWAS, this is unprecedented, and so therefore it draws attention to the issues, not just at the surface, but what is really going on, what exactly has led to these kinds of grievances and this is the kind of statements that these countries or these juntas within these countries are trying to make and of course you would agree that they have scored a point in that, this is all international politics playing out, as far as they’re losses, reality is they pulling out, definitely would have calculated and understood some of the losses that would come to them and the reality is, economic wise they would eventually face some losses, it might not necessarily be significant, but then the losses will be there, that’s a corridor for trade, it’s an old trade corridor as you know, between Nigeria, particularly northern Nigeria up to Timbuktu through to Libya and then of course to Ethiopia, Eritrea into the haul of Spain, so it’s an old trade corridor which basically still has some significance till present day because, in as much as it has moved to ships and whatever, that route by road is still significant and these countries are countries with many destitute, they’re not really global powers, they’re not shakers, their GDP’s are not very strong as you know.
‘Therefore they’re reliant on trade, it will definitely bring some hurt to their economy but the larger picture is what they have done making statement, of course this is also going to hurt ECOWAS as well because ECOWAS has been talking about the idea of floating the ECHO, which is a single currency and single customs and single market for the sub regional countries, which they were planning on, you know floating, I think in 2027 but this has brought significant setbacks to that. So On that basis, that’s one of the losses for both sides, and then of course in the area of foreign policy, in the area of security, ECOWAS stands to lose even much more because Nigeria for example prides itself to be the big brother of Africa. This is a great policy somersault and a slap in our foreign policy objective to see that we have not achieved the ideals of pan Africanism, which is what our founding fathers stood out for.’
It is often said in war, there is no winner and definitely in this there seems to be no winner and perhaps it right time for the combatants to come to a round table and bury their ego.
Olukayode Idowu lives in Abuja